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A comparison is made between the frequency of local minima in the analytic power (AP) of
intracranial EEG (ECoG) fromwaking and unconscious human subjects and the frequency of
putative frames of consciousness reported in earlier psychological literature. In ECoG from
unconscious subjects, the frequency of deepminima inAP is found to be a linear function of
bandwidth. In contrast, in ECoG fromconscious subjects, the bandwidth/minima-frequency
curve saturates or plateaus at minima frequencies similar to the frequencies of previously
reported frames of consciousness. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that local
minima in AP may act as the shutter in a cinematographic model of consciousness. The
fact that artiﬁcially generated samples of black noise with power spectra similar to ECoG
data give similar results in the analyses above suggests that the discontinuous nature of
consciousness is not due to some speciﬁcally biological factor, but is simply a consequence
of the physical properties of the 1/f (aka power law) oscillations that are widely found in
nature.
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INTRODUCTION
The idea that an individual’s consciousness is not continuous but
occurs as a series of discrete chunks or perceptual moments has a
long history. It ﬁrst appeared nearly 2,000 years ago, as the Bud-
dhist doctrine of ksanikavada (Pruden, 1988; Schweizer, 1994).
It was considered and rejected in the late nineteenth century by
James (1890). The commercialization of movies in the early twen-
tieth century offered an obvious technological metaphor, which
led to a good deal of psychological experimentation in the middle
of the twentieth century on the question of whether or not con-
sciousness occurs in cinematographic frames (Augenstine, 1955;
Stroud, 1955; Allport, 1968; Efron, 1970). Finally, a serious ﬂurry
of activity in the late twentieth and early twenty-ﬁrst centuries
resulted from the publication of a paper by Purves et al. (1996)
called “The wagon wheel illusion in movies and reality.”
Purves and colleagues reported that an illusion resembling the
one which causes rolling wagon wheels to appear to stop and
move backward in old cowboy movies also occurs in real life,
under natural light. In movies, the illusion is due to aliasing or
undersampling of the wheel’s motion, caused by the fact that
silent movies ran at only 16 frames per second (i.e., 62.5ms per
frame), which was found empirically to be the minimum refresh
rate necessary for generation of the visual illusion of continuous
motion when the subject was moving at the speed of a walking
human. Initially it seemed an obvious conclusion that a similar
undersampling effect explained the real-life version of the wagon
wheel illusion, which in turn implied the existence of discrete per-
ceptual moments similar to the discrete frames of movie footage
(Purves et al., 1996; Crick and Koch, 2003; VanRullen and Koch,
2003; Sacks, 2004). However experimental reports soon started
appearing which either denied the occurrence of the wagon wheel
illusion altogether (Pakarian and Yasamy, 2003) or conﬁrmed the
effect but described new experimental evidence that contradicted
the aliasing explanation – for example that the apparent reversal
of the wheel’s rotation never occurred when the wheel was seen in
a mirror (Kline et al., 2004). Controversy erupted (Andrews and
Purves, 2005; Andrews et al., 2005; Holcombe et al., 2005) and the
argument was never deﬁnitively settled.
However, investigations of a more physiological nature – for
example, the reports of Lehmann and colleagues that EEG data
occur in a series of spatially deﬁned“microstates”(Lehmann,1971;
Lehmann et al., 1987, 1998; Lehmann and Koenig, 1997) – also
strongly suggest a discontinuity in consciousness. Similar discrete
brain states were reported by Freeman and colleagues (Freeman
and Rogers, 2002; Freeman et al., 2003a,b; Freeman, 2004a,b), who
showed that the analytic power (AP) of band-pass ﬁltered EEG
exhibits a series of local minima or “null spikes” at which the ana-
lytic phase of the EEG time series jumps abruptly and the relatively
constant spatial electromagnetic pattern seen in any given area of
brain changes to a different spatial pattern. These results led Free-
man (2006) to hypothesize that the state transitions occurring at
AP minima might provide a physiological basis for the frames of
a cinematographic consciousness.
With slightmodiﬁcation to emphasize the delineationof frames
only by deep minima in AP, this null-spikes-as-shutter hypothesis
ﬁts neatly into the electromagnetic ﬁeld theory of consciousness
(Pockett, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2007, 2011, in press). The electro-
magnetic ﬁeld theory of consciousness proposes that conscious
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experiences are identical with certain electromagnetic patterns
generated by brain activity. This implies that periods when brain-
generated electromagnetic activity falls below some threshold level
should correlate with periods when consciousness fails – which
is exactly what the modiﬁed null-spikes-as-shutter hypothesis
proposes.
The idea that electromagnetic activity has to exceed somemin-
imum value in order to subserve consciousness already garners
some empirical support from the neuromagnetic experiments of
Tononi et al. (1998). In the words of those authors “1. Neural
responses to rivalrous visual stimuli occurred in a large number
of cortical regions, both when the subject consciously perceived
the stimuli and when he did not. 2. Responses evoked by a stim-
ulus over a large portion of the scalp were stronger when the
subjects were conscious of it that when they were not.” This indi-
cates that relatively strong electromagnetic activity is a correlate of
consciousness.
At this stage it is important to be clear that a minimum amount
of electromagnetic activity is proposed by the wider electromag-
netic ﬁeld theory of consciousness and the narrower null-spikes-
as-shutter hypothesis as being necessary but not sufﬁcient for con-
sciousness. The most recent formulation of the electromagnetic
ﬁeld theory (Pockett, 2011, in press) also proposes an additional
factor as being necessary but not sufﬁcient for consciousness: a
particular pattern of LFP-generated electric charge in the radial
direction, perpendicular to the surface of the brain. This pat-
tern is not measurable by surface electrodes like those used in
the present study, which can only deliver a measure of the overall
amplitude of electric transients occurring within a few mm in any
direction from each electrode, but its speciﬁcation of the radial
pattern is important, because if voltage clamping of elements of
the proposed pattern were to cause changes in consciousness with-
out changes in ongoing neural activity, this would provide strong
empirical support for the electromagnetic ﬁeld theory of con-
sciousness as opposed to the psychoneural identity theory. Even
then, however, the electromagnetic ﬁeld theory would still be in
a very early stage of its formulation. A great deal more empirical
work would still be necessary to deﬁne the factors that are not only
necessary but also sufﬁcient for any given conscious experience.
The null-spikes-as-shutter hypothesis refers only to one of a
number of factors that put constraints on consciousness. It says
that in the absence of enough overall electromagnetic amplitude, it
does notmatterwhetherwhat amplitude youdohave is disposed in
the correct spatial pattern or not – you can not have consciousness.
Of course the converse is not implied: there are amultitude of pos-
sible situations where there is too little electromagnetic amplitude
to support consciousness and very few of them would ever be able
to generate electromagnetic patterns that would be sufﬁcient for
consciousness. The point is that the null-spikes-as-shutter hypoth-
esis refers only to one factor that constrains consciousness. It does
not claim to specify anything that is even remotely diagnostic of a
conscious experience.
That being said, the main aim of the work reported here is to
test the validity of the null-spikes-as-shutter hypothesis.According
to Popper’s (1995) classic Logik der Forschung, it is not possi-
ble to prove a scientiﬁc hypothesis – the best that can be done
is to fail to falsify it. One way of attempting to falsify the null-
spikes-as-shutter hypothesis would be to measure the frequency
of deep local minima in the AP of EEG data and compare this with
the frequency of the putative frames of consciousness reported
in the psychological literature. If the two sets of frequencies
proved to be radically different, the null-spikes-as-shutter hypoth-
esis would be falsiﬁed. If there were good correlation between the
two sets of frequencies, both the idea that consciousness occurs
in frames and the hypothesis that AP minima serve to delin-
eate those frames would be supported – though of course not
proven.
However, there is one major difﬁculty associated with doing
such a test. Theproblem is thatRice (1952) showedmathematically
that the frequency of local minima in theAP of white noise ﬁltered
by an ideal band-pass ﬁlter is linearly related to the bandwidth of
the ﬁlter. Speciﬁcally (Rice, 1952 p.9):
frequency of minima = 0.64110 (bandwidth) (1)
Under most conditions EEG more closely resembles brown or
black noise than the white noise analyzed by Rice, but both Free-
man (2009) and Ruiz et al. (2010) have tested Rice’s relationship
empirically and found that, at least for narrow bandwidths, EEG
data do conform remarkably well to Eq. 1. This makes it dif-
ﬁcult to do a clean empirical test of the null-spikes-as-shutter
hypothesis, because it is far from clear how (or even whether)
the unsampled electromagnetic products of brain activity are
intrinsically band limited. A good deal of evidence suggests that
various passbands within the gamma range are associated with
various kinds of consciousness (e.g., Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand,
1999; Summerﬁeld et al., 2002; Tallon-Baudry, 2009) and ongo-
ing theta (Freeman, 2009; Busch and VanRullen, 2010) or alpha
(Varela et al., 1981; Mathewson et al., 2009) oscillations have also
been reported to be important in facilitating consciousness. But
according to Eq. 1, it is not the center frequency of any ﬁlter pass-
band that matters with regard to the frequency of frames, it is
the width of the passband – and there is presently no empiri-
cal evidence at all to guide the selection of any particular band
width for a principled comparison of the frequency of AP min-
ima with the frequency of psychologically measured frames of
consciousness.
Here we address this issue by measuring the frequency of
deep AP minima in ECoG data from conscious and unconscious
subjects, over an extended series of bandwidths and for several
different values of required minimum AP. We then compare the
results of these measurements with the durations of the putative
frames of consciousness reported in the psychological literature.
We also repeat these analyses on samples of artiﬁcial black noise
with the same power density spectra as waking ECoG.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
DATA
Data were recorded from four adult subjects in whom intracranial
electrodes had been implanted for the clinical purpose of localiz-
ing epileptic foci. The subjects (three female) ranged in age from
23 to 38 years. All had medically refractory, localization-related
epilepsy, manifested by complex partial and secondarily general-
ized seizures, and all were candidates for epilepsy surgery. The
subjects were evaluated at the University of Washington Regional
Epilepsy Center, based at Harborview Medical Center in Seat-
tle, Washington. Initial non-invasive evaluation included detailed
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history, clinical examination, standard EEG, magnetic resonance
imaging,neuropsychological assessment, and longterm scalpEEG-
video monitor studies. After determination that invasive EEG
recordings were necessary to localize seizure onsets, each subject
underwent longterm intracranial subdural EEG-video monitor
recordings, which included placement of a subdural, 64 con-
tact, 8× 8 grid of electrodes over the convexity of the cerebral
hemisphere of interest, supplemented by subdural strip electrodes
(6–16 electrodes each) implanted over adjacent cortical regions.
The interelectrode distance (center to center) within an indi-
vidual grid or strip array was 10mm and the total number of
intracranial electrodes ranged from 98 to 128 contacts. The loca-
tion of the grid in one patient is shown in Figure 1: location
in the other three patients was similar. The location of invasive
electrodes and length of time deemed necessary for continuous
EEG-video recordings were dictated solely by clinical considera-
tions. Each patient gave informed consent prior to invasive EEG
recordings, and permission for EEG analysis for research purposes
was obtained from the University of Washington Human Subjects
Review Committee.
Data were recorded at a sampling rate of 500Hz for two of
the subjects and 2000Hz for the other two, with analog pass-
bands of 1–100Hz. Since the subjects were routinely videotaped,
seizure activity was easily identiﬁed from the video as well as
from visual inspection of the intracranial EEG records. Waking
data were obtained from time periods when the video showed
the subject in a state of quiet wakefulness and the EEG data
were artifact-free on visual inspection. Postictal recordings were
selected from 1min time periods immediately following a convul-
sive seizure, when high voltage ictal activity ceases and the EEG
appears on visual analysis to be of relatively low amplitude and
“quiescent,” with minimal artifact. During this period all subjects
FIGURE 1 | Location of recording electrodes.
were deemed unconscious, on the grounds that theywere amnestic
and unresponsive to external stimuli (Pockett and Holmes, 2009).
For comparison with these data, power law artiﬁcial noise was
generated by convolving random noise with a 1/fβ ﬁlter, where
β= 0 for white noise, 1 for pink noise, 2 for brown noise, and 3 for
black noise.
SIGNAL PROCESSING
Signal processing was done in Matlab. ECoG data were visually
inspected via plots of the time series at each electrode and the
occasional channel containing signiﬁcant recording artifacts was
discarded. The remaining channels were converted to a single spa-
tial ensemble average (SEA) by taking the mean of all channels at
each time point. A notch ﬁlter was applied to remove the spike
of 60Hz line noise, by Fourier transforming the SEA, replacing
the 60Hz value with the mean of the values in the two adjacent
frequency bins and then applying the inverse Fourier transform.
Power density spectra (P) as a function of frequency (f) were
computed for the notched SEA data using the Thompson mul-
titaper method (Matlab “pmtm.m”). The power spectra for all
four subjects were then averaged and the result plotted on log–
log axes. The slope of this plot was determined by ﬁtting a linear
regression line to the values log(P i) and log(fi) (i = 1, 2, . . ., n) for
the frequency range selected, using a weighting scheme designed
to compensate for the fact that in a log–log plot there are an
exponentially increasing number of points at higher frequencies.
Speciﬁcally, the regression process solved for the parameters α and
β which minimize the weighted least squares residual
LSR =
n∑
i=1
wi
(
log (Pi) −
[
α + β log (fi
)])2
,
where the weight wi is
wi = 1
fi
1
σ2i
,
and σi is the SE for the logarithm of the mean power density
obtained from the four individual log–log plots. The 1fi factor
effects the compensation for unequally spaced spectral compo-
nents on the log–log plot. In the case of constant σi, this would
ensure that the total weighting for the points in a given frequency
rangewould be proportional to the change in log(f) over that range
(and hence the weighting per decade would be constant).
The SE in the slope was calculated using the analytic expres-
sion for the slope β recast as a linear combination of the power
densities and combining the SEs of the power density components
on the assumption that there is no correlation of errors between
individual power density components.
The notched SEA time series were then ﬁltered into a series of
increasingly wide passbands around a selected center frequency.At
very narrow bandwidths, standard FIR ﬁlters produced passbands
in which the upper and lower frequency transition regions were a
substantial fraction of the total bandwidth, which made compari-
son of our empirical results withRice’s theoretical equation (which
assumes a perfect ﬁlter) dubious.We therefore abandoned FIR ﬁl-
tering and instead windowed the FFT-derived frequency spectrum
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directly, using awindow employing a bi-exponential spline around
the nominated upper and lower passband indices. End effects were
obviated by adding inverted copies of the data to each end of the
time series before applying the bi-exponential ﬁlter. For each set
of ﬁltered data, a time series of AP was then computed by cal-
culating the analytic signal (Matlab “hilbert.m”) and adding the
square of the real part of the analytic signal to the square of the
imaginary part of the analytic signal. Finally the data extensions
were removed.
Deep minima were picked in the resulting AP time series by
ﬁrst picking all minima (by comparing each data point in the
time series with the data points on either side of it) and then
selecting only those minima the amplitude of which fell below a
given threshold, which was expressed in terms of a percentage of
the mean amplitude of all minima in that dataset. In a few cases,
this algorithm was extended to ignore the larger of two minima
bracketing a peak which itself failed to rise above the threshold.
RESULTS
Figure 2 serves as an intuition pump to demonstrate the meaning
of AP. The analytic signal of a real data sequence is a complex
transform which has a real part identical to the original data and
an imaginary part containing the Hilbert transform, which is a
version of the original signal phase-shifted by 90˚. Analytic power
scribes out the envelope of the squared (real+ imaginary) parts
of the analytic signal. Essentially, AP approaches zero when there
is very little deviation of the original signal from zero, in either a
positive or negative direction.
Figure 3 shows the power density spectra of raw waking ECoG
(Figure 3A) and raw ECoG recorded during the postictal state
of unconsciousness (Figure 3B). The mean slope of the log–log
plot for all subjects in Figure 3A is −2.93± 0.09 (mean± SD).
The slope of the major portion of the log–log plot in Figure 3B is
0.07± 0.05.
Figure 4 shows the AP time series of segments of (Figure 4A)
waking and (Figure 4B) postictal ECoG data, with circles around
the minima picked in our analysis. It can be seen that in waking
data (Figure 4A),many of theminima in the AP time series do not
approach zero, but appear only as high frequency but low-power
blips on the ﬂanks of the much larger low-frequency peaks. In
contrast, most of the minima in the AP time series of postictal
FIGURE 2 | Relationship of analytic power to time series.
(unconscious) data (Figure 4B) do approach zero. This is because
raw postictal data largely have the ﬂat power spectrum of white
noise, in which high frequencies have the same power as low fre-
quencies (see Figure 3B). Therefore in postictal AP data there are
no small (low-power), high-frequency blips on the shoulder of
large (higher-power), low-frequency peaks.
A further observation is that at around times 0.64 and 0.73 s
in Figure 4A, two local minima are picked which (a) occur very
close together in time and (b) bracket a maximum or peak which
itself fails to rise above the set threshold (horizontal line). On
the rationale that such peaks could no more be expected to sub-
serve consciousness than the minima that delineate them, some
of the analyses reported below were repeated using a minima-
picking algorithm designed to ignore the larger of two such
minima. This involved an exceptionally complex algorithm which
tended to cause Matlab to throw out-of-memory errors, and since
it was found to make essentially no difference to the results of
the further analyzes, these were mostly performed using the sim-
pler minima-picking code described in the Section “Materials and
Methods.”
Figure 5 shows how these observations play out into the “Rice
curves” of waking and postictal data. It can be seen that above a
FIGURE 3 | Power density spectra for (A) waking ECoG and (B)
postictally unconscious ECoG.Thick lines: mean of all four subjects. Thin
lines: plus and minus one SD from the mean.
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FIGURE 4 | Minima selected in segments of (A) waking and (B)
postictally unconscious ECoG from the same subject.Threshold below
which minima must fall in order to be counted (horizontal line) set at 30% of
the mean amplitude for all minima in this dataset.
bandwidth of about 60Hz, the frequency of APminima in waking
data plateaus or saturates at about 17Hz (mean of all subjects,
with the threshold below which minima have to fall in order to be
counted set at 30% of all minima in the dataset in question). In
contrast, the frequency of AP minima in postictally unconscious
data maintains a rectilinear relationship with bandwidth up to the
highest available bandwidth, which in this case was constrained by
the setting of the analog low pass ﬁlter in the recording apparatus.
Table 1 illustrates the effect of changing the threshold setting
on the frequency at which AP minima saturate, showing individ-
ual results for each subject. It can be seen that the SD of the 20
observations in the plateau region of all Rice curves are relatively
small, indicating that the plateaux are quite ﬂat. For each subject
the mean plateau value increases in a predictable fashion as the
threshold is raised, allowing more minima to be counted. For any
given subject and setting, the frequency of AP minima in the SEA
(shown) was not signiﬁcantly different from that in data from a
random single electrode in the middle of the main grid (p > 0.05,
t -test).
Artiﬁcial noise constructed to have the power density spectra
with log–log slopes similar to those of our ECoG data produced
Rice curves similar to those of the data.
DISCUSSION
The stated aim of this series of analyses was to investigate the
idea that consciousness occurs in frames because AP occurs in
FIGURE 5 | Rice curves for waking and postictally unconscious ECoG
data. Analytic power minima with threshold set at 30% (as in Figure 4).
Center frequency of all passbands is 50Hz – thus a bandwidth of 40Hz on
the horizontal axis represents a passband of 30–70Hz and a bandwidth of
60Hz represents a passband of 20–80Hz. Circles represent mean values
for all four subjects.
Table 1 | Effect of threshold setting on plateau frequency of analytic
power minima in waking ECoG.
Threshold setting
(% mean analytic
power minimum
for that dataset)
Plateau frequency of analytic power minima
(Hz) (mean±SD of 20 observations in plateau)
Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4
10 8.4±1.3 9.9±1.2 11.4±1.6 11.5±1.2
20 12.4±1.1 13.9±1.7 16.2±1.6 16.1±1.6
30 15.5±1.1 16.7±1.8 19.9±1.6 19.7±1.6
40 18.8±1.1 19.3±2.0 22.7±1.4 23.4±1.8
frames, by comparing our physiological measurements of AP
with the psychological evidence in the literature on frames of
consciousness.
Table 2 summarizes the psychological evidence in the litera-
ture. Most experiments report that vision occurs in frames lasting
between 50 and 100ms, i.e., at frame frequencies of 10–20Hz.
Table 1 summarizes the frequencies at which deep AP minima
plateau in our waking ECoG,with a Rice curve center frequency of
50Hz (mid-gamma, widely thought to be an important frequency
rangewith regard to consciousness) and the threshold belowwhich
an AP minimum had to fall in order to be counted set at between
10 and 40% of the mean minimum in the dataset. The frequency
of APminima plateaus at between 8.4± 1.3Hz (for Subject 1 with
the AP minimum threshold set at 10%) and 23.4± 1.8Hz (for
Subject 4 with the AP minimum threshold set at 40%). Hence, the
frequency of APminima in ECoG fromourwaking subjects closely
parallels the frequency of frames of visual consciousness reported
in the psychological literature –not only over awide range of band-
widths, but also for a wide range of threshold minimum values
(from 10 to 40% of the mean minimum in the dataset).
These results arise from spatially averaged ECoG, recorded
from subjects who were not performing a visual task set by the
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Table 2 | Frequencies of frames of visual consciousness in
psychological literature.
Reference Frame
frequency (Hz)
Frame
duration (ms)
Exner [quoted by James (1890)] 23 44
Stroud (1955) 5–20 50–200
Allport (1968) 10–17 60–100
Pockett (2003) 22 45
Simpson et al. (2005) 16 63
VanRullen et al. (2005) 10–20 50–100
experimenter, but simply resting quietly with eyes open. Thus one
question is whether or not the AP minima we measured were
merely artifacts of spatial averaging, and another is whether or
not we were actually measuring the neural correlates of visual
consciousness.
With regard to the ﬁrst question, individual minima certainly
did fall at different times in the SEA and in data from individual
electrodes, but the overall values at which minima plateaued in
the two datasets were not signiﬁcantly different. Even individual
electrodes in a commercial ECoG grid integrate data from a rel-
atively large area of brain. Whether this is seen as a ﬂaw or an
advantage depends on one’s views about the spatial scale that is
important in the study of consciousness. Those who believe, with
Crick (1994) and others, that the ﬁring of action potentials by sin-
gle cells is the important thing might well recommend wholesale
rejection of the entire literature on the relationship of conscious-
ness to ECoG or scalp EEG. On the other hand, champions of the
electromagnetic ﬁeld theory of consciousness tend to agree with
Walter Freeman’s long-held view that the mesoscopic spatial scale
ismore relevant than either themicroscopic ormacroscopic scales.
On yet another axis, proponents of the global workspace model
(Baars, 1988; Dehaene et al., 2006) might prefer the macroscopic
scale that is arguably captured by Freeman’s original introduction
of the SEA as an object of study.One interesting thing that emerges
from our present analysis is that in the matter of the frequency of
local minima in AP, there seems to be little difference between the
mesoscopic and macroscopic scales.
The second issue about the present analysis is whether or not
our data relate speciﬁcally to visual consciousness. This question
can be subdivided into two parts – ﬁrst whether the data are spe-
ciﬁc to consciousness, and secondly whether they are speciﬁc to
visual consciousness.
The ﬁrst part of this issue is addressed by our comparison of
data from awake and postictally unconscious subjects. We chose
the postictal state as the safest possible example of general uncon-
sciousness because all other supposedly unconscious states were
not represented by data available to us – and indeed may not be
represented in a very secure way by any data.
Unconsciousness is generally inferred if two criteria are met:
the subject is (a) unreactive (does not respond to external stimuli)
and (b) amnestic (does not remember afterward being conscious
at the time in question). With regard to anesthesia, these criteria
may on the face of it be fulﬁlled inmost cases, but it can not reason-
ably be inferred from this that at any given point in time surgical
anesthesia has necessarily resulted in unconsciousness. In purely
pragmatic terms, the main aims of an anesthetist are threefold: (1)
keep the patient alive (2) keep the patient from moving and (3)
keep the patient from initiating a malpractice suit. With regard
to aim (1), the zone between unconsciousness and death can be
hazardously narrow, so it is in everyone’s interest that anesthesia
be kept as light as possible. In practice, this means that aim (2) is
routinely achieved by the use of neuromuscular blocking agents
(Murphy et al., 2002). Without these, patients are often so reac-
tive to surgical stimuli that life becomes difﬁcult for the surgeon.
Neuromuscular blocking agents act peripherally at the neuromus-
cular junction and are well known to paralyze even wide awake
individuals, so while their use may result in formal fulﬁllment of
the criterion of unreactivity, it can hardly be concluded that this
necessarily means the patient is unconscious. With regard to the
anesthetist’s third aim and the second criterion of unconscious-
ness, it is common practice to add to the anesthetic cocktail one
or more drugs that compromise memory formation. Despite this,
the incidence of intraoperative awareness with recall is reported to
range from 0.2% in non-cardiac, non-obstetric surgery to 11–43%
in major trauma surgery (Ghoneim, 2000). Pain is often reported
to be absent during such unintended awakenings, since adequate
analgesia can exist independently of adequate anesthesia. This is
fortunate, because it is arguable that a higher incidence of intra-
operative awareness with recall may be prevented only by routine
blockade of recall by the previously mentioned memory forma-
tion blockers. If a patient wakes up during the operation but fails
to remember this afterward, does it matter? In legal terms, prob-
ably not. A simple benzodiazepine pre-med effectively inhibits
formation of any peri-operative memories.
The other major state in which unconsciousness might be
inferred is NREM sleep. But NREM sleep is now known not to
be necessarily dream-free (Hobson et al., 2000). Dreams are cer-
tainly a form of consciousness, albeit one in which the subject is
usually both unreactive and amnestic – so again, where does that
leave our two criteria of unconsciousness?
In contrast, the postictal state that occurs during the few min-
utes after cessation of a generalized tonic–clonic seizure is one in
which the patient is unreactive, amnestic, and producing ECoG
data with power spectra so completely different from those pro-
duced by waking brains (cf Figures 3A,B) or brains in NREM
sleep (Freeman et al., 2006) that there seems little possibility of its
underpinning any covert form of consciousness. When the sub-
ject is in this state, Figure 5 shows that no plateau occurs in the
Rice curve. The complete lack of a Rice curve plateau in data from
unconscious subjects reinforces the idea that theRice curve plateau
may be the important thing in determining the frame frequency
of consciousness.
With regard to the question of whether or not our data relate
speciﬁcally to visual consciousness: our subjects were certainly
not performing visual tasks set by the experimenter. However, the
video record showed that they were awake with eyes open, so it is a
reasonable inference that they were experiencing visual sensations.
The environment was quiet, so they were unlikely to be experienc-
ing auditory sensations (with the possible exception of tinnitus).
They were not in pain, so they were probably not experiencing any
signiﬁcant somatosensory sensations. Given that generally only
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experienced mediators are able to stop thinking completely, our
subjects probably were experiencing conscious cognition. But in
terms of sensation, vision is likely to have been the overwhelm-
ing form of consciousness experienced by our waking subjects.
We were not able for clinical reasons to obtain data from grids
placed over early visual areas, but the processing of visual infor-
mation certainly involves activity in verywidespread areas of brain,
including some areas directly under the electrode grids and strips
from which our measurements were taken (Logothetis and Schall,
1989; Leopold and Logothetis, 1996; Sheinberg and Logothetis,
1997; Tononi et al., 1998; Kreiman et al., 2000; Gattass et al., 2005;
Quiroga et al., 2005).
Hence we argue that our data are consistent with the hypothesis
that
(i) A certain minimum value of AP – for our data probably more
than 50μV2/Hz – is necessary (albeit not sufﬁcient) for visual
consciousness and
(ii) Because the AP generated by the waking brain repetitively
falls below this minimum at intervals that are on average not
shorter than 50–100ms, visual consciousness occurs in frames
or chunks lasing at least 50–100ms.
In other words, deep minima in brain AP may well act as the
shutter in a cinematographic model of consciousness.
The question of whether this AP-related discontinuity of con-
sciousness arises from some speciﬁcally biological factor or purely
as a consequence of the physical properties of 1/f signals is
answered by our examination of artiﬁcial 1/f noise. Repeating our
analyzes on artiﬁcial noise showed that artiﬁcial 1/f signals con-
structed to have the same power spectra as biological data produce
the same Rice curves as the biological data. This suggests the fol-
lowing multi-part answer to the question “why is consciousness
discontinuous?”:
1. Local AP minima occur in all 1/f (aka power law) spectra,
whether or not the generators of those spectra have anything
to do with consciousness. Local minima are simply a physical
feature of 1/f spectra.
2. All EEG data have 1/f spectra. In data from conscious subjects
the exponent of the f is between 2 and 3. In data from our
postictally unconscious subjects the exponent of f over most of
the frequency spectrum is essentially 0. But in both cases the
spectra are 1/f.
3. Hence, the AP time series of all EEG data – irrespective of
whether or not they underpin consciousness – have local
minima. Brain AP occurs in frames.
4. Therefore, IF (as proposed by both the EM ﬁeld theory of con-
sciousness and the null-spikes-as-shutters hypothesis) a certain
amount of brain-generated AP is necessary for consciousness,
consciousness must occur in frames.
5. It is not logical to suggest the converse: that all data with AP
minima must have something to do with consciousness.
This answer is supported and extended by a closer look at the
Rice curves generated by the different exponents of f in data
from conscious and unconscious brains. It can be seen (Figure 5;
Table 1) that the duration of the frames of AP in conscious
brains saturates or plateaus at approximately the same duration
reported by a number of earlier psychological studies on frames
of consciousness (Table 2). The psychological studies more or
less agree that consciousness comes in frames lasting in the range
of 50–100ms. The Rice curves in the present study plateau at
frame durations of about 50–100ms. This correspondence pro-
vides support not only for the null-spikes-as-shutter hypothesis,
but also for the wider electromagnetic ﬁeld theory of conscious-
ness, both of which predict that consciousness should occur
in frames because AP occurs in frames. If AP frames in data
from conscious brains had turned out to have radically differ-
ent durations from the frames of consciousness reported by the
psychological studies, the null-spikes-as-shutter hypothesis would
have been disproved. But they did not – there is rough coin-
cidence between AP frame duration and consciousness frame
duration.
In contrast, when the data analyzed in Rice curves come from
unconscious brains, no plateau of frame duration is evident. As
the data are ﬁltered into increasingly wide passbands, the duration
of AP frames just keeps getting shorter. There is no obvious cor-
respondence between the duration of AP frames and the duration
of previously reported frames of consciousness. This is obviously
a much weaker argument in favor of the theory and hypothesis
under investigation, but the non-correspondence is at the very
least interesting.
A number of further questions are raised by the above answer to
the question “why is consciousness discontinuous?” For example,
it would be nice to know the mechanism by which the brain gen-
erates 1/f spectra in the ﬁrst place. It would be even nicer to know
exactly what is going on in the brain between the deep local min-
ima inAP that wemeasure, and how this differs between conscious
and unconscious brains.
With regard to the former question, the answer is simply
unknown. Power law (aka 1/f) spectra are ubiquitous in nature.
They are generated by all manner of processes which on the face
of it are completely unrelated. Nobody understands why. In fact,
as Ward and Greenwood (2007) put it, “The ubiquity of 1/f noise
has been described as one of the oldest puzzles of contemporary
physics and science in general.”Certainly the present authors have
tried and failed to understand the synaptic mechanisms by which
the 1/f spectra of EEG in particular are generated. This failure is
probably not surprising, considering that the exact synapticmech-
anisms by which any given sample of EEG is generated presently
remain obscure.
When it comes to the latter question, the situation is slightly
better. With regard to AP, one difference between conscious and
unconscious brains is that the intermittently widespread phase
synchrony characteristic of waking brains (Pockett et al., 2009)
is greatly reduced in unconscious brains (Pockett and Holmes,
2009). Pockett (in press) expands earlier statements of the elec-
tromagnetic ﬁeld theory of consciousness to a model of the shape
of conscious as opposed to unconscious brain-generated electro-
magnetic patterns which transparently explains these and other
observations. Further work on the active networks revealed by
electrode-to-electrode synchrony measurements in waking and
unconscious brains is planned.
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